To Defend or Not to Defend: Commercial General Liability (CGL) Insurers at the Center of Opioid Litigation by Thornton, Clay
/
 (/)
H O M E  ( / )
A B O U T
B L O G  ( / B L O G )
O N L I N E  O R I G I N A L S  ( / O N L I N E - O R I G I N A L S )
S Y M P O S I U M
S U B M I S S I O N S  ( / S U B M I S S I O N S )
To Defend or Not to Defend: Commercial General Liability
(CGL) Insurers at the Center of Opioid Litigation
J A N U A R Y
10 ,  2 02 0
· C O R E  T E R M S :  I N S U R A N C E  ( / B L O G / T A G / C O R E + T E R M S % 3 A + I N S U R A N C E ) ,  I N S U R A N C E  D E F E N S E  ( / B L O G / T A G / I N S U R A N C E + D E F E N S E ) ,  D U T Y  T O  D E F E N D
( / B L O G / T A G / D U T Y + T O + D E F E N D ) ,  D E F E N D  ( / B L O G / T A G / D E F E N D ) ,  D E F E N S E  ( / B L O G / T A G / D E F E N S E ) ,  L I T I G A T I O N  ( / B L O G / T A G / L I T I G A T I O N ) ,  O P I O I D
L I T I G A T I O N  ( / B L O G / T A G / O P I O I D + L I T I G A T I O N ) ,  P R O D U C T S  L I A B I L I T Y  ( / B L O G / T A G / P R O D U C T S + L I A B I L I T Y ) ,  G E N E R A L  C O M M E R C I A L  L I A B I L I T Y
I N S U R A N C E  ( / B L O G / T A G / G E N E R A L + C O M M E R C I A L + L I A B I L I T Y + I N S U R A N C E ) ,  B U S I N E S S  L I A B I L I T Y  P O L I C Y  ( / B L O G / T A G / B U S I N E S S + L I A B I L I T Y + P O L I C Y ) ,
B U S I N E S S  L I A B I L I T Y  P O L I C I E S  ( / B L O G / T A G / B U S I N E S S + L I A B I L I T Y + P O L I C I E S ) ,  P H A R M A C E U T I C A L S  ( / B L O G / T A G / P H A R M A C E U T I C A L S ) ,  P H A R M A C E U T I C A L
D I S T R I B U T O R S  ( / B L O G / T A G / P H A R M A C E U T I C A L + D I S T R I B U T O R S ) ,  C O V E R A G E  ( / B L O G / T A G / C O V E R A G E ) ,  I N S U R E D  ( / B L O G / T A G / I N S U R E D ) ,
E X C L U S I O N A R Y  P R O V I S I O N S  ( / B L O G / T A G / E X C L U S I O N A R Y + P R O V I S I O N S ) ,  O C C U R R E N C E  ( / B L O G / T A G / O C C U R R E N C E ) ,  B O D I L Y  I N J U R Y
( / B L O G / T A G / B O D I L Y + I N J U R Y ) ,  P R O P E R T Y  D A M A G E  ( / B L O G / T A G / P R O P E R T Y + D A M A G E ) ,  A L L E G A T I O N S  ( / B L O G / T A G / A L L E G A T I O N S ) ,  P R O D U C T S
( / B L O G / T A G / P R O D U C T S ) ,  F I R E A R M S  ( / B L O G / T A G / F I R E A R M S ) ,  G U N  M A N U F A C T U R E R S  ( / B L O G / T A G / G U N + M A N U F A C T U R E R S ) ,  P I L L  M I L L  S U I T .
( / B L O G / T A G / P I L L + M I L L + S U I T . )
Blog Post | 108 KY. L. J. ONLINE | January 10, 2020
To Defend or Not to Defend: Commercial General Liability (CGL) Insurers at the Center of Opioid Litigation
Clay Thornton[1] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn1)
In light of the opioid epidemic, drug distributors are being brought into 
litigation. A question intriguing many insurers is to what extent do they have 
a duty to defend drug distributors in “pill mill” litigation? Underlying this 
issue is an inquiry as to whether the product was defective with respect to 
its intended use.[2] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-
9C1880E55035#_edn2)
Generally, like any other business entity, pharmaceutical drug distributors 
may hold commercial general liability [hereafter “CGL”] insurance, 
sometimes referred to as business liability policies.[3] 
(applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-
9C1880E55035#_edn3) CGL insurance provides coverage to business 
and commercial entities for specified categories of claims arising from 
injury to property and from liability for claims brought by a third party 
against the insured.[4] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-
9C1880E55035#_edn4)
While the federal court for the Western District of Kentucky has held that the insurance company has a duty to defend the pharmaceutical drug distributor,
[5] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn5) several jurisdictions have held there is no duty to defend based upon prior 
gun manufacturing cases.[6] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn6)
Duty To Defend
/
In Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Richie Enterprises, LLC, Richie Enterprises, LLC [hereafter “Richie”], a pharmaceutical drug distributor incorporated in 
Kentucky, was sued alongside twelve other drug distributors by the State of West Virginia, whose Attorney General alleged that they were supplying 
doctors and drugstores with drug quantities in excess of legitimate medical need.[7] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-
9C1880E55035#_edn7) Richie sought insurance defense from Cincinnati Insurance under its CGL policy; however, Richie refused to provide defense after 
concluding the claims brought by West Virginia were not covered by the CGL policy’s limits.[8] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-
9C1880E55035#_edn8) Cincinnati Insurance filed a declaratory judgment that there would be no duty to defend.[9] (applewebdata://B052BA34-
6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn9)
Under Kentucky law, an insurer has a duty to defend when “there is any allegation which potentially, possibly or might come within the coverage of the 
policy”; or, restated in other words, the “insurance company must defend any suit in which the language of the complaint would bring it within the policy 
coverage regardless of the merit of the action.”[10] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn10)
Based upon the language of the CGL policy, the Western District of Kentucky had to determine whether the complaint alleged an: “occurrence”, “bodily 
injury” or “property damage”, and whether the possibility for coverage was removed by the policy’s exclusionary clause regarding intentional and criminal 
acts.[11] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn11) Similar to other CGL policies, the policy at hand provided the 
following definitions: “Occurrence” is "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions."[12] 
(applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn12) “Bodily injury” is "bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, 
including death resulting from any of these at any time."[13] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn13) “Property 
damage” is "[p]hysical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property."[14] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-
9C1880E55035#_edn14)
Occurrence
The Kentucky courts have defined “occurrence” to mean an “accident,” which inherently points to the doctrine of fortuity comprised of two central 
components, namely intent and control.[15] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn15) Regarding intent, Cincinnati 
Insurance contended West Virginia’s claim that Ritchie provided drugs in excess of medical necessity created a foreseeable result;[16] 
(applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn16) whereas, Ritchie argued the alleged claims sounded in negligence and, 
further, Ritchie was simply distributing in response to orders received from doctors and state-regulated pharmacies.[17] (applewebdata://B052BA34-
6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn17) Regarding control, Cincinnati Insurance contended that the supplying of drugs to pharmacies was not an 
accidental result by Ritchie; whereas, Ritchie argued that the resulting drug epidemic was not foreseeable from their actions and was completely within the 
control of the pharmacists, physicians, and end-users of the prescription drugs.[18] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-
9C1880E55035#_edn18) Favoring Ritchie, the Western District held there was an occurrence.[19] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-
9C1880E55035#_edn19)
Bodily Injury or Property Damage
Cincinnati Insurance provided several substantive and persuasive arguments which indicated that the Attorney General’s Complaint sounded in economic 
damages, as opposed to “bodily injury” or “property damage”; however, the Western District of Kentucky favored a conclusion of bodily injury due to 
medical monitoring. [20] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn20)
Intentional and Criminal Act Exclusionary Provision
Cincinnati Insurance finally argued that the allegations of intentional and criminal conduct made their intentional and criminal act exclusionary provision 
applicable. In Thompson v. West American Ins. Co., the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that “allegations of the complaint cannot compel a defense if 
coverage does not exist”  and, further, that the “obligation to defend arises out of the insurance contract, not from the allegations of the complaint against 
the insured.”[21] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn21)
The Western District of Kentucky, however, held the conduct of distributing prescription drugs based upon orders placed by pharmacies is not, in and of 
itself, illegal and the violation of laws could be reasonably anticipated.[22] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-
9C1880E55035#_edn22) Thus, the Western District concluded that the insurer had a duty to defend.[23] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-
9713-9C1880E55035#_edn23) This decision was bolstered by a similar holding from a district court in South Carolina regarding one of the other 
defendant-drug distributors.[24] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn24)
No Duty To Defend
Products-Completed Operations Exclusions & “Arising Out of” Considerations
In three federal court cases, the courts have concluded that a products exclusion provision operated to exclude coverage for claims against gun 
manufacturers for injuries allegedly caused by the guns the insureds had manufactured, and the insurers in opioid litigation have looked to these cases for 
support.[25] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn25) The issue is whether the damages “arise out of” the use of guns, 
and are thus excluded from coverage under the policies’ products-completed operations hazard exclusions.[26] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-
46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn26)
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “arise” to mean “[t]o spring up, originate, to come into being or notice.”[27] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-
9713-9C1880E55035#_edn27) In Mass. Bay. Ins. Co. v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., the victims and family of victims of a shooting incident sued several 
/
gun manufacturers.[28] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn28) There, a Maine District Court held the damage that 
the product in question, namely firearms, created was within the products- completed operations hazard language and was thus excluded from coverage.
[29] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn29) The Maine District Court looked to an earlier decision by the First Circuit 
regarding gun manufacturers in Brazas Sporting Arms v. American Empire Surplus, in which the insured argued that the exclusion was limited to defective 
products.[30] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn30)The First Circuit rejected the insured’s argument by stating:
The products-completed operations hazard includes in plain and unambiguous language “all ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage occurring away from 
premises you own or rent and arising out of ‘your product.’” Where, as here, the language of the exclusion provision is unambiguous, the text should be 
given its plain meaning. In this case, the plain meaning of the exclusion is that it applies to all product-related injuries.[31] (applewebdata://B052BA34-
6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn31)
In Taurus, another gun manufacturer case, the insured again argued that the products-completed operations exclusion should be applied only to defective 
product.[32] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn32) The Taurus court’s review of case law across the nation revealed: 
First, most courts have not considered whether such provisions should only apply to defective products. Second, those that have are split on the issue of 
whether to construe “arising out of” language as restricted to only defective products or a broader interpretation. Third, the language of the policy is the 
most important factor for determining the duty to defend question.[33] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-
9C1880E55035#_edn33) The Taurus court ultimately held there was no coverage because the claims fell within exclusions for “‘bodily injury and property 
damage … arising out of your product.’”[34] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn34)
In opioid litigation citing these gun manufacturing cases, the court in The Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v. Actavis, Inc. held the insurer had no 
duty to defend the insured-pharmaceutical companies.[35] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn35) Regarding an 
“occurrence,” or “accident,” the Court of Appeal of California held that the test is “whether an additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen 
happening produced the consequences.”[36] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn36) There, the court said the role of 
doctors in prescribing, or misprescribing, opioids is not an independent or unforeseen happening.[37] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-
9C1880E55035#_edn37) Regarding Products Exclusion language, the insurance policies in question provided: exclusion of coverage for bodily injury 
“arising out of” (Travelers Policies) or that “results from” (St. Paul Policies) “[a]ny goods or products…manufactured, sold, handled, distributed or disposed 
of by” the insured.[38] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn38) The Products Exclusions in the policies at question 
were unambiguous, stating: 
The declarations page states that the Travelers Policies have a general aggregate limit that applies to claims “[o]ther than Products-Completed Operations.” 
Because no classification of products claims is listed on the declarations page or a policy schedule, all products and operations are subject to the Products 
Exclusions.[39] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn39) A host of federal and state cases supported this decision 
in Actavis, Inc. that Products Exclusions bar coverage. [40] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn40)
Conclusion
The sample of court decisions provided exemplify how courts have reached different conclusions regarding insurer’s duty to defend in opioid litigation. The 
decisions have depended upon the construction of the insurance policy at hand,[41] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-46F6-9713-
9C1880E55035#_edn41) differing state law interpretations of “occurrences” or “accidents” regarding intent,[42] (applewebdata://B052BA34-6BED-
46F6-9713-9C1880E55035#_edn42) and court interpretations of products-completed exclusionary clauses.
 With that recognition, depending on the jurisdiction in which an insurer finds themselves, the answer may still be unclear. However, if there is any 
consolation, the standing case law provides a litany of successful arguments for both insurers and insureds in future opioid litigation.
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